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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant used a firearm or a facsimile of

a firearm while robbing the Mountain America Credit Onion on
February 28, 1986, when he pointed an object concealed in his
pocket at the victim and said, "This is a robbery.

Don't turn it

into a homicide," and "If anyone tries to follow me, I will blast
you."
2.

Whether the trial court instructed the jury as to

the proper definition of "facsimile."
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing to give a requested cautionary eyewitness instruction.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

Case No. 860431

HARRY F. SUNIVILLE,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Harry F. Suniville, was charged with
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery in a jury
trial held June 11, 1986, in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard
H. Russon, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Russon on

July 7, 1986, to five years to life at the Utah State Prison to
run consecutively with another sentence appellant was already
serving (R. 11-14, 106-07).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 28, 1986, during the noon hour, a man
entered the Mountain America Credit Union in Midvale, Utah.

He

wore a dark striped knitted ski mask over his face (R. 140), a
long gold-yellow, parka-type hunting coat (R. 150), and blue
jeans (R. 158). He went to bank teller Suzette Anderson's
window.

She observed that his right hand remained in the pocket

of his coat (R. 140). He raised the pocket up over the counter

above the window "like he had a gun" (R. 140). The teller
observed, Mtlhere was something pointing at me in his pocket"
(R. 140). The assailant then said, "This is a robbery.
turn it into a homicide.

Don't

Give me all of your money." (R. 140).

As the teller opened her drawer, the robber said, "Big bills,"
and "I know about the bait money." (R. 141). As Suzette started
going through the money, the man grabbed it with his left hand,
put it in his left pocket, and headed toward the front door (R.
141).

When he got to the door, he stopped and said, "If anyone

tries to follow me, I will blast you."

(R. 141). He opened the

door and went out heading west toward the parking lot (R. 144).
As he left, his right hand remained in his coat pocket (R. 159).
Ms. Anderson later filled out a police report giving
her perception that the assailant had a gun (R. 154), although
she never personally saw a gun (R. 152). At trial, she described
the robber as a white male, 25-32 years old, six feet tall, 180200 pounds, with blue or green eyes and brown hair (R. 140, 147,
149).

She also noted that he walked with an unusual gait (he

bounced while his feet scraped against the floor) (R. 142).
Although she could not identify her assailant, she did note
defendant's gait during the trial and said it was "very similar"
to that of the robberfs (R. 142-43).
Dan Parker, a construction worker, was eating his lunch
in his truck just outside the credit union when he saw a man,
whom he later identified as defendant (R. 169-70), exit the
credit union wearing a blue knitted ski mask and a beige or gold
mountaineer-type coat (R. 166-67, 174). The defendant pulled the
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mask off as he ran directly in front of Parker (R. 167-175).

His

right hand was in the pocket of his coat (R. 177). Parker
suspected a robbery and ran after the defendant shouting at him
(R. 167-68).

Defendant did not stop but continued to run through

an underground parking area, jumped a short wall and got into a
late 7Q's or early 80's dark brown Caraero (R. 169-70, 185) which
was parked in an uncovered parking lot (R. 168) .

As defendant

reached his car, he looked directly at Parker (R. 169, 178-79).
Parker subsequently identified defendant's photograph from photo
spreads twice prior to trial (R. 191, 194, 196). He also
identified defendant at a preliminary hearing and at trial (R.
169, 196). Parker described the man he saw as being 20-30 years
old, six feet tall, weighing 140 pounds and having brown hair (R.
181-82).

He said that during the incident defendant always kept

his right hand in the pocket of the large beige coat he was
wearing (R. 176-77).
As defendant exited the credit union and pulled off his
mask, he was also seen by Harry Barker and Jeffrey Hill who were
working together just underneath the covered parking area (R.
221).

Barker saw defendant exit the building, pull off a dark

blue or black ski mask, and hold it in his left hand, and start
running directly toward them at a distance of 75 feet (R. 222,
227).

Barker alerted Hill to what was gong on (R. 222) .

Barker

observed defendant slow down as he came within 15 feet of them
before he ran around them (R. 228-29).

Barker even told the man,

"You look like you just robbed a bank." (R. 223). Barker
described the man as a white male, six feet tall, 160-170 pounds,
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brown hair, clean shaven, wearing faded blue jeans, worn work
boots, and a tan parka with a drawstring pulled tight below his
belt (R. 230-32).

He was also carrying something in his right

hand1 and the mask in his left hand (R. 231-32).
Barker positively identified defendant at trial as the
person he had seen fleeing that day (R. 223-224).

He had

previously observed a photo spread and picked out two photos of
persons who looked like the assailant.

One was of the defendant

(R. 224-25, 236-38; Defendant's Exhibit 5-D).
Jeffrey Hill observed the defendant come off the stairs
just outside the credit union (R. 203) and run toward them from a
distance of 40 feet until he was 15 feet from them (R. 215). He
described the man as five feet eleven inches tall, with brown
hair, wearing a heavy coat (R. 203) . 2

The man had both hands out

of his pockets and was carrying a navy blue or black stocking in
his left hand (R. 204, 215-16).

He noted the man has the "same

unusual type stride or walk" that defendant exhibited at trial
(R. 206). Hill picked defendant's photograph out of a photo
display (R. 207), and he positively identified defendant at trial
as the man he had seen running from the credit union (R. 204,
207) .

1

Barker testified as follows: "He had something in his right
hand, but I couldn't tell what it was. I didn't know whether it
was a gun or something else. I just couldn't tell what it was"
(R. 231).
2

On direct examination, Hill was not sure of the color of the
coat. However, on cross-examination he said it was "a greenishbrown army color" or "khaki" (R. 216) .

4-

Nick Dubois was also working in the area at noon on
February 28th (R. 239). He heard someone yelling and saw other
workmen running across the upper level of the parking lot toward
him pointing and motioning (R. 240). He then saw someone run out
from underneath the parking terrace (R. 240). The man had
something in his hand (R. 241). Someone yelled, "the bank has
been robbedi" (R. 240). Dubois then saw the man run across the
lot and jump into a car (R. 242). Aware there had been a
possible robberyr he watched the car "very closely" (R. 242). He
described it as a chocolate brown Camero built between 1970-75
with no license plate (R. 242-43).

The chrome "beautifier" rims

on the wheels of the car were all bent (R. 243, 250-51).
Although he could not identify defendant, a week and a half after
the robbery occurred, Dubois observed the same "chocolate brown
Camero" parked in front of defendant's residence (R. 245-48).
Defendant was later arrested while driving the same Camero (R.
266).
After the State rested, the defendant moved to dismiss
or in the alternative, moved to reduce the charge to simple
robbery on the theory that the state had failed to establish that
a firearm, knife or facsimile of a firearm or knife or a deadly
weapon had been used in the commission of the robbery as required
by Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1953), as amended (R. 28796).

Following argument, the motion was denied (R. 296).
The defense requested an instruction defining facsimile

as "an exact and precise copy, preserving all the marks of the
original" (Defendant's requested instruction No. 6; R. 56). The
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court refused the instruction and gave the prosecution1s
requested instruction which read, "A facsimile of a firearm is
any item or thing that by its appearance resembles a firearm."
(Inst. No. 18; R. 72; cf. Prosecution's requested instruction No.
7 (R. 47)). The defense also requested a limited form of a
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification which was
refused by the court (Defendant's requested instruction

No. 5;

R. 55). The court did give general instructions on the
credibility of witnesses (Instruction Nos. 6 and 10f R. 60f 64).
All of the above instructions are set forth in Appendix A of this
brief.

The defense made timely objection to the court's refusal

to give his requested instructions (R. 320-32).
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury
found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery on June 11, 1986 (R.
83).

On June 26, 1986, defendant moved to arrest judgment

because Judge Russon had denied his request that a cautionary
eyewitness instruction be given to the jury (R. 104). On July 7,
1986, Judge Russon denied defendant's motion and sentenced him to
five years to life at the Utah State Prison.

This sentence was

to run consecutively with a sentence defendant was already
serving (R. 106).
From this judgment and sentence defendant now appeals
(R. 108).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendant created a belief in the victim
through words and actions that defendant truly did have a gun in
his pocket and intended to use it, a facsimile of a firearm was
effectively employed in the robbery.
-6-

The trial judge correctly instructed the jury as to the
proper meaning of the term "facsimile."
Finally, because this Court's decision in State v.
LonQt 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), does not retroactively apply to
appellant's case, the giving of cautionary instructions on
eyewitness identification is left to the discretion of the trial
judge, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
refusing to give appellant's requested cautionary eyewitness
instruction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT
A FACSIMILE OF A FIREARM WAS USED IN THE
ROBBERY.
Defendant suggests there is no evidence that he used a
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm while robbing the Mountain
America Credit Union.
While none of the witnesses actually saw a firearm and
no gun was found, Suzette Anderson saw what she perceived to be a
gun pointing at her from inside the defendant's right pocket.
She also heard him say "don't turn it into a homicide" and "If
anyone tries to follow me, I will blast you."

It was her

reasonable belief that defendant would shoot her if she did not
quickly give him the money, and she even advised the
investigating officers that her assailant had a gun (R. 140-41,
154).
Harry Barker also observed something in defendant's
right hand as he ran past him, but Barker was unsure whether it
was a gun (R. 231)•

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302(1) (1978), provides:
(1) a person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he: (a)
uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firarm,
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly
weapon . • . •
The criminal code contains no definition of facsimile of a
firearm.
The lower court applied a subjective test to determine
whether a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm was used in the
robbery.^

The clear majority of jurisdictions that have

considered this issue have supported this test and have held that
the use of an unarmed robber's hand in such a way as to convey
the impression that the robber is armed will bring the robbery
within the statutes proscribing actual armed robbery.

See State

v. Hopson, 122 Wis.2d 395, 362 N.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Wis. Ct. App.
1984), and all cases cited therein.
The basic relationale behind the subjective test is
twofold.

First:
[A] victim who is threatened with a supposed
weapon which is concealed is put in the same
degree of fear and feels as strongly
compelled to comply with the robber's demands
as a victim who is threatened with a weapon

3 Judge Russon stated: M i l t is the Court's belief and
interpretation of the statute involved [76-6-302], and in light
of State v. Turner, that when one uses any object with the intent
to make the victim believe there is a gun and the victim
reasonably could believe there is a gun, that whatever object is
being used is, in fact, a facsimile of a firearm whether it is a
piece of pipe in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a finger, if
that is perceived by the victim as being a gun and is intended by
the perpetrator to be a gun or to at least make the victim think
it is a gun, I believe we have the elements necessary to meet
requirements of aggravated armed robbery" (R. 296).
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which is openly displayed,4
Hopson, 362 N.W.2d at 169.

And second:

To find as a matter of law that where a gun
is not seen a defendant cannot be convicted
of the armed feature is to allow all would-be
robbers to keep a gun or other dangerous
weapon concealed during the crime to be used
only if needed. To read the statute in this
light 'would have the effect of placing it in
the power of the transgressor to defeat the
object and purpose of the law by evasion.1
State v. Cooper. 140 N.J. Super. 28, 354 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).

See also, Breedlove v. State, 482 So.

2d 1277, 1281-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Henderson, 34
Wash. App. 865, 664 p.2d 1291, 1293 (1983).

The sole concern

with the subjective test is the possibility that a suspect might
be convicted of aggravated (armed) robbery merely because the
victim believed, without support for the belief, that the suspect
might be armed.

Hopson, 362 N.W.2d at 170.

However, this Court

may adopt a construction of the statute which requires, as
occurred in this case, that the victim's belief be reasonable.
IdDefendant contends that this Court has not adopted a
subjective standard test to determine what constitutes a
facsimile.

However, in State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah

1977), this Court quoted the definition of "facsimile" as found
in Webster's New Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Edition, as:
of making copy, imitation" (Emphasis added).
4

"1. Act

The Court then

It is clear that even a finger placed in the pocket in the
shape of a gun when combined with the defendants threatening
actions and/or words is capable of causing the victim to believe
the defendant is armed.
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cited People v. Delgardo, 1 Misc. 2d 821, 146 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356
(1955) as an explanation for the word imitation:
The word imitation when applied to pistols
and revolvers means so nearly resembling the
genuine as to mislead, with the apparent
object of producing, and likely to produce,
upon the minds of those against whom it is to
be used, the belief that the imitation weapon
is capable of producing all the injurious
consequences to the victim as the use of the
genuine article itself.

When defendant raised an object concealed in his pocket
over the teller's counter and pointed it at the victim while
exclaiming "don't turn it into a homicide,11 and later said, "I
will blast you," it is clear he wanted Ms. Anderson to believe he
was armed with a weapon.

Defendant's words and actions produced

this belief in the victim and placed the robbery within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)(a).
The evidence established that defendant used a
facsimile of a firearm.

Therefore, his conviction for armed

robbery was proper.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF "FACSIMILE".
Judge Russon gave the jury the following definition of
facsimile as instruction number 18:
A facsimile of a firearm is any item or thing
that by its appearance resembles a firearm
(R. 72) .
Defendant contends that his requested instruction also
needed to be given to the jury to correct the vague and imprecise
nature of instruction no. 18 (See Appellant's Brief at 11). His
requested instruction states in pertinent part:
-10-

A facsimile is defined as an exact and
precise copy, preserving all the marks of the
original.
(R. 5 6 ) . He cites this Court's decision in Turner as supporting
his position.

The lower court in Turner gave two facsimile

instructions to the jury (instruction nos. 11 and 12).
Instruction no. 11 was similar to defendant's requested
instruction in the instant case:
You are instructed that a facsimile is
defined as: an exact and precise copy of
anything. An exact reproduction, for
example, the signature reproduced by a rubber
stamp.
State v. Turner, 572 P.2d at 389.

Instruction no. 12, which is

substantially the same as the court's instruction no. 18 in the
case at bar, reads:
You are further instructed that a facsimile
of a firearm is any instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm.

The defendant in Turner asserted, as does defendant in
the present case, that instruction no. 11 was acceptable but that
instruction no. 12 "expands the meaning of 'facsimile' beyond its
proper definition."

Id.

This Court, however, did not agree.

It

found "the Ilower] court's instruction no. 12 to be a 'sensible
interpretation' of the statutory language."

Id.

The Court was primarily concerned that instruction no.
11 would conflict with the "sensible" instruction no. 12 and
create confusion and vagueness.

This Court, however, "did not

perceive sufficient tension between the definitions of
•facsimile1 in instruction nos. 11 and 12 to constitute defective
vagueness."

Id.
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Applying Turner to the instant casef the lower court's
instuction no, 18 was "a sensible interpretation of the statutory
language."

No additional facsimile instruction needed to be

given to correct any supposed vagueness or imprecision.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
Defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated robbery
on June 11, 1986.

Nine days laterr this Court in State v. Long,

721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), required that from the day Long was
filed (June 20, 1986), judges were to give cautionary jury
instructions on eyewitness identification whenever such an
instruction is requested by the defendant and when eyewitness
identification is a central issue in the case. £d. at 492.5
Six days after Long was decided, defendant filed a
motion to arrest judgment because the judge had refused to give
defendant's requested cautionary instruction at trial (R. 104,
321) .*>

On July 7, 1986, defendant's motion was denied and he was

sentenced (R. 106).
5

Prior to Long, this Court had held that the giving of such
cautionary instructions was to be left to the discretion of the
trial court. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985);
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985).
^ The scope of defendant's so-called cautionary instruction was
very limited (See Defendant's requested instruction no. 5, R. 55,
set forth in Appendix A ) . It merely advised the jury that the
state had the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable
doubt, and noted that identification testimony depends on the
opportunity of the witness to observe the offender at the time of
the offense and make a reliable identification later. It did not
purport to "advise the jury as to the potential difficulties of
eyewitness identification" or "comport in substance with the type
of jury instruction that this court mandated in Long"
(Appellant's brief at 14-15).
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Defendant contends that it would be arbitrarily unjust
to exclude him from receiving Long's benefits simply because his
verdict and conviction were rendered nine days before Long was
decided especially since he was not sentenced until July 7, 1986
(Appellant's Brief at 1 6 ) .
This Court specifically intended that Long be applied
prospectively:
We therefore today abandon our discretionary
approach to cautionary instructions and
direct that in cases tried from this day
forward, trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eye-witness identification is a central issue in a case and such an
instruction is requested by the defense.
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added).

The relevant

language could be read in a reasonable, common sense manner as
cases commenced from this day forward.

At most, the term "tried

from this day forward" might be construed to accommodate cases
commenced before Long, but where the jury was not yet instructed.
But the language should not be tortured to cover cases like the
instant one, where the jury had already rendered its verdict and
had been dismissed.
This case was in fact tried before Long was decided.
Both sides had rested, the jury had rendered its verdict and had
been excused.

It would not have been reasonable or practical to

reconvene the jury and ask them to reconsider their verdict in
light of Long, and give them a detailed cautionary instruction on
eyewitness identification.

Nor would it have been necessary

given the corroborative evidence in this case.
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Defendant claims that any refusal to accord him the
retroactive benefit of Long would be arbitrary,

However, it is

well-established that the federal constitution "neither prohibits
nor requires" retroactivity of state judicial decisions.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618r 629 (1965); Great Northern
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364
(1932).

Rather,

"Itlhe federal constitution has no voice upon

the subject" and the Supreme Court has left the states to develop
their own rules on retroactivity: "a state in defining the limits
of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between
the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward."

Sunburst Oil, 287 U.S. at 364. Thus, either choice

affords due process of law.

16. at 363-64. £f. Andrews v.

Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (refusing to extend retroactive
benefit of State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert, denied,
469 U.S. 988 (1982), to cases already final; and State v. Norton,
675 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942
(1984) (according retroactive benefit of Wood to cases not yet
final) .
Finally, defendant claims that even if the pre-Long
standard of this Court is applicable to his case, it was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion not to give his requested
instruction.

In a post-Long case which was tried before Long was

decided, this Court held that judicial discretion could be used
to decide if a cautionary instruction should be given:
[Tlhe Long decision was specifically limited
in its application to cases tried after its
date of issuance. Trial of the present case
preceded Long, and therefore defendant's
-14-

claim must be evaluated under prior case law
to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to give the
required cautionary instruction.
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 1986).
In Jonas, this Court ruled that the trial judge abused
his discretion by not giving the requested cautionary
instruction.
instant case.

However, Jonas is easily distinguishable from the
In Jonas there was a solitary eyewitness, the

victim, who observed his assailant for only an instant before
being stuck in the ribs with a handgun and knocked unconscious.
The victim was attacked at night and appeared to be uncertain as
to the location of the assault and the identity of the
perpetrator.

The instant case is more comparable to this

Court's recent decision in State v. Quevado, Utah, No. 19049
(March 26, 1987).

In Quevado. this Court held that the lower

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a
cautionary instruction when the defendant was convicted based
upon the testimony of four eyewitnesses and the identification of
the jacket the defendant wore when arrested as the same jacket
worn by the fleeing suspect.

£d. at 3.

See also, State v.

Remington, Utah, No. 86031 (March 31, 1987).
In the case at bar, there were three eyewitnesses who
identified defendant as the person they saw running from the
credit union at noon on February 28, 1986.

All three

eyewitnesses observed defendant for far more than a few seconds
at a relatively close distance.

They all paid close attention to

what they saw since they suspected foul play.

-is-

There was also corroborating evidence to support the
eyewitness identification.

A witness positively identified

defendant's car as the same vehicle used in the robbery7 and the
victim and another eyewitness in this case observed that
defendant virtually had the same distinctive gait as the
assailant.
This case is similar to other pre-Long cases in that
"it is highly likely that the result would have been exactly the
same even if a cautionary instrution had been given."

Jonas, at

1380.
Moreover, in his closing argument, defense counsel
fully presented the critical factors in eyewitness identification
which lasted for a total of 13 pages in the transcript (R. 33649).

Thus, the jury was sufficiently alerted to the possibility

of error in eyewitness identification.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed.
DATED this 16

day of April, 19 87.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

^ This Court held in Quevado that the identification of the
defendant's jacket was "not so subject to error as the
identification of a person". Id. at 3.
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